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IN THE S·UPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
DAN T. ORR,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

)

vs.
CLEGG LIVESTOCK COMPANY,
INC., -a corporation,

) Case No. 7658

Defendant and Appellant,

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF F.&CTS
The plaintiff brought this action to recover from
the defendant the sum of $1,495.00 together with interest
thereon, for thirteen head of cattle which the plaintiff alleged were purchased by the defendant from
plaintiff on the 5th day of January, 1949, and delivered
by the plaintiff to the defendant on the same date,
under the terms of a certain ·agreement between the
parties herein, entered into on the 5th day of January,
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1949, and a copy of whi~h agreement was attached to
plaintiff's complaint and marked Exhibit "A" and
by reference made a part thereof.
The defendant filed an answer and cross complaint
1n which defendant admitted the execution of the
agreement, Exhibit "A" and made a general denial
of the other material allegations of plaintiff's complaint. As a further defense the defendant alleged
that in accordance with the terms of said agreement,
E:x:hibit "A" the parties gathered 86 head of cattle
on May 14, 1949, 7 head of cattle on May 17, 1949,
and 16 head of cattle on June 9, 1949, making a total
of 109 head of cattle gathered from the open range.
Defendant further alleged! that on the 9th day of
June, 1949, the plaintiff delivered to the defendant 25
head of s·aid 109 head of cattle, as leased cattle and
as provided for by the terms of the agreement between
the parties, Exhibit "A", and delivered the other 84
head of said 109 head of cattle to the defendant and was
then and there paid the sum of $'6,660.00, which together
with the $3,000.00 ·cash paid at the time of the execution of said agreement constituted payment in full
for such 84 head of cattle at the agreed price of
$115.00 per head; that on the 6th day of July, 1949,
there were delivered to the defendant by the plaintiff
13 head of cattle and the plaintiff was then and there
paid the sum of $1,495.00 by the defendant; that on the
17th day of August, 1949, the parties gathered one
cow and she was delivered to the defendant and the
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plaintiff was paid the sum of $115.00 ; that at the
tin1es when all three such deliveries were so made the
brand of the plaintiff was vented on all cattle so
delivered. Defendant further alleged that on the 1st
day of iliarch, 1950, it tendered to the plaintiff an
interest payment in the sum of $150.48 which payment
was rejected by the plaintiff.
Defendant alleges, by way of cross complaint,
that between the dates of January 1, 1949 and April
30, 1949, the defendant sold and delivered to the plaintiff 85 tons ·of hay of the reasonable value of $44.00
per ton and for a total price of $3,740.00, and 12 ton
of cotton seed cake at $100.00 per ton for a total of
$1,200.00 and furnished services and labor of men
and machinery to the plaintiff for the reasonable value
of $1,025.00 and p-r,ayed judgment against the plaintiff
for dismissal of his complaint and for judgment· in
the sum of $5,965.00. Plaintiff filed an answer to this
cross complaint and admitted the execution of the
agreement, Exhibit "A" and denied the other material allegations of the cross complaint.
Trial was had, without a jury, and the phiintiff
was given judgment against the defendant in the sum
of $1,495.00, representing the value of 13 head of
catle at $115.00 per head, together with interest thereon
from January 5, 1949, together with costs in the
amount of $45.40.
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Thereinafter the defendant filed a Motion for a
New Trial on the following grounds ; insufficiency of
the evidence to justify the judgment; that the evidence
herein is insufficient to support the findings herein by
the court; that the judgment entered is against the
law. The motion for a new trial was argued by counsel for the parties and denied by the court and the
defendant appeals.
All italics are mine.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
1. That the agreement between the parties, Exhibit ''A'' is an executory agreement to sell and not
an executed agreement of sale and that title to said
cattle remained in the plaintiff until delivery was
made in June, July and August, 1949.
2.

That the evidence is insufficient to support

the findings of the ·court as to Findings of fact, Sections two, three, four and five.
3. That the judgment is contrary to the findings
of the court, section six of the findings.
4.

The judgment is contrary to the law.

5. Appellant's motion for a New Trial should
have been gr.anted.
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ARGUMENT
THAT THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES
IS AN EXECUTORY AGREEMENT TO SELL AND NOT AN
EXECUTED AGREEMENT OF SALE AND THAT THE
TITLE TO THE PROPERTY INVOLVED REMAINED IN
THE PLAINTIFF UNTIL DELIVERY WAS MADE BY
THE PLAINTIFF ON OR ABOUT THE 15th DAY OF
MAY, 1949, AS PROVIDED FOR BY THE TERMS
OF SAID AGREEMENT AND ANY LOSS UP TO THAT
TIMEl SHOULD BE AT THE EXPENSE OF THE SELLER:
THAT THE LANGUAGE OF THE PARTIES USED IN SAID
AGREEMENT IS CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS AND THE
INTENTION OF THE PARTIES SHOULD BE DETERMINED BY THE LANGUAGE USED IN THE SAID AGREEMENT: THAT THE TITLE TO SAID CATTLE REMAINED IN THE PLAINTIFF UNTIL DELIVERY ON OR
ABOUT MAY 15, 1949, AND PLAINTIFF WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE FEED FOR SUCH CATTLE UP TO THAT
TIME AS FURNISHED TO THE PLAINTIFF BY THE
DEFENDANT, AND THEREFORE THE COURT ERRED IN
GRANTING JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF
AND AGAINST THE DEFENDANT.

Contracts involving the sale of personal property
are divided into two classifications by the statutes of
this state. They are classified as contracts to sell and
contracts of sale. Utah Code Annotated, 1943, Title

81, Chapter 1, Section 1 provides as follows:
81-1-1.
1.

Contract to Sell and Sales.

A contract to sell goods is a contract whereby the seller argees to transfer the property
in goods to the buyer for a consideration
called the price.
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2. A s,ale of goods is an agreement whereby
the seller transfers the property in goods to
the buyer for a consideration called the price.
The text books on this same subject classify the
contracts to sell as Executory Contracts and the contracts of sale as Executed Contracts. In 55 C. J. page
39, Section 6, we find these two types of contracts
defined as follows :
''An executed sale or executed contract to
sell personal property exists where nothing remains to be done by either party to effect ~
complete transfer of title to the subject matter
of the sale. ''
''An executory s,ale or an executory contract
to sell is one under which something remains to
be done by either party before delivery and
passing of title.''
The Utah Court in Middleton vs. Ev,ans, 86 Utah
396, 45 Pac. 2nd 570, decided in 1935, states as follows:
"It is a well established rule of law that
where the language of a contract is clear and
unambiguous, it is the duty of the court to
determine the intent of the parties from the
language used by the parties in- the agreement.''
If we apply this rule to the present ease we find
that the agreement, exhibit "A", clearly uses
language which indicates and clearly establishes the
fact that the parties intended to and did enter into
an executory contract to sell and not an executed
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contract of s·ale. In line twenty-four of page two of
such agreement the contract reads as follows: ''all
of said cattle will be gathered by on or about May
15, 1949, and that all of said cattle will be sold to the
Lessee (defendant) herein.'' In line thirty of page
two it again states, "all of the remaining cattle will
be sold to the Lessee (defendant) herein." This language clearly indicates that there was something to
be done, that is, that the eattle were to be gathered
on or about May 15, 1949, and would then be sold to
the defendant. The further defense of the defendant
alleges that said cattle were so gathered and delivered
to the defendant beginning with May 14, 1949, and
the evidence sustains this allegation. Transcript pages
70 and 71.
In the case of Middleton vs. Evarns, cited above,
the court states further:

"Under section 81-2-1 no property in the
goods is transferred to the buyer unless and
until the goods are ascertained'' and
''Section 81-2-2 provides that under a contract to sell, the property in the goods is transferred to the buyer at such time as the parties
to the contract intend it to be transferred" and
''for the purpose of ·ascertaining the intention
of the parties regards shall be had to the terms
of the contract, the conduct of the parties, usages
of trade ·and circumstances of the case.''
In applying this reasoning to the instant case it
would seem certain that the cattle to be delivered and
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sold to the defendant by the plaintiff would not be
ascertained until they were gathered and delivered to
the defendant on or about May 15, 1949, as expressly
set forth by the terms of the ·agreement and that therefore no property would pass until that time and that
any loss up to that time would be ·at the expense of
the Seller, and in this case the plaintiff. The evidence
clearly shows that no number was ascertained, as to
any cattle sold and delivered to the defendant, until
the months of May, June, July and August, and that
the loss of the thirteen head, which is the basis of
the suit of the palintiff, took place many months prior
to the date of gathering and delivery in the month of
May and thereafter.
If in our present case we look to Utah Code Annotated, 1943, Rule 2, under Title 81, Chapter 2, Section
3, we find the following:
''Where there is a contract to sell specific
goods, and the seller is bound to do something
to the goods for the purpose of putting them in
a deliverable state, the property does not pass
until such thing is done."
It would seem clear that from the language used
by the parties in the agreement, exhibit "A" that the
seller had the obligation to gather, count, vent the
brands on the cattle to be delivered on or about the 15th
day of May, 1949, before title to the cattle would pass
to the buyer, and that any loss up to that time would be
on the Seller.
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The court below found, findings of fact sections
two and three that the defendant purchased the cattle
in question at the time he signed the agreement on the
5th day of January, 1949, and at such time went into
constructive possession of said cattle and that the parties intended that the defendant have possession of
said cattle and that defendant feed them.
The court further found, findings of fact section
six, that the plaintiff refused to permit the defendant
to spray said animals in the spring of 1949. This finding would infer that the Seller still intended that the
ownership was in him and that he had the right to
exercise control over the property being sold. This
refusal on the part of the plaintiff to allow the defendant to spray said cattle in April, 1949, is sustained by
both the testimony of the plaintiff and Howard J.
Clegg, for the defendant. In further support of the
contention of the defendant that title remained in the
plaintiff until the actual delivery and payment made
during June, July and August, 1949, is found in line
ten, page three of the agreement, exhibit "A" between
the parties which reads as follows; "title to said cattle
shall remain in the Lessor herein until they are paid
for by the Lessee.'' The Lessor is the plaintiff and
the lessee is the defendant.
In Ruling Case Law, Vol. 24, page 20, section 282
we find the following statement of the law as to the
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sale of personal property where it is contemplated by
the parties that the property to be sold will be weighed,
measured or counted at a later date.
"The general doctrine seems to be that a sale
of personal property is not contemplated while
·anything remains to be done to determine its
quantity, as by weighing, measuring, counting, if
the price depends on this, unless this is done by
the buyer alone, and there is no other evidence
to show the intention of the parties that the
title shall pass before the quantity or price is
so determined. The reason for this is because
ordinarily in such transactions it is the intention of the parties that the title and the cor-responding risk remains in the seller, until the
price is definitely ascertained. Thus in the
English case of Zagury v. Furnell (2 Campb.
242) where several bales of skins (stated in a
contract to contain five dozen in each bale)
were sold at a certain price per dozen, but it
was the duty of the Seller to count over the
skins, to see how many each bale contained, and
before so doing they were consumed by fire,
Lord Ellenbourough and Sir James Mansfield
held the loss to be entirely on the seller.'' This
same rule is approved and applied in the case
of Williams vs. Allen (Tenn.), 51 Am. Dec. 709.
Other jurisdictions have many cases upholding the
same rule of law as set forth immediately above. The
Supreme court of Oklahoma in an old case, which
seems to still be the law, decided in 1913, and reported
in 132 Pac. 683 states the rule as follows:
"The rule is that, if, under a contract for the
sale of specific goods, the selled is bound to do
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something to the goods for the purpose of putting them in a deliverable state, that is, into a
condition in which the buyer is bound to accept
them, unless a different intention appears, the
property does not pass until such thing is done;
as where trees are to be trimmed, cotton to be
ginned and baled, fish to be dried, crops to be
gathered or threshed, cattle to be fattened, hops
to be baled, machinery to be set up, or lumber
to be sawed or planed, the doing of the thing
is presumably or presumptively a condition
precedent to the transfer of the property. In
the case of an executory agreement, as the proposed purchaser does not become the owner of
the goods he cannot claim them specifically; he
is not the sufferer if they are lost, cannot maintain trover for them, and has, at common law
no other remedy for breach of contract than an
·action for damages.''
Words & Phrases, Vol. 3, Page 32, states: Anything short of passing title is not a sale, but an agreement to sell.
An illinois case wherein practically the same language was used ·as was used in this case now before
the court, to wit, agrees to sell and in our case, will be
sold, states as follows:

Windmiller vs. Flemming, 129 Ill. App. 476.
''A distinction exists between sale and agreement to sell, agreement to sell is merely executory and passes no title even in a distinct and
specified chattel. The words agrees to sell are
taken in ·ordinary acceptation of referring to
the future."
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The liability of the plaintiff as to the claim set
forth in the cross complaint of the plaintiff will be
determined when a final determination is made· as to
ownership of the cattle at the time the feed was consumed by the cattle. It is quite apparent that the
responsibility for the feed as set forth in the cross
complaint would rest upon the party owning the livestock to which it was fed. There 'seems to be no
argument between the parties to the contrary.
I res.pectfully sumbit that the judgment of the
District Court should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,

M. EARL MARSHALL,
Attorney for the Defendamt
and Appellant.
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